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I. Introduction: Within and Without the Open Method 
of Co-ordination: How to Establish a Language of 
Rights in Labour Law Reforms 
This chapter is focused principally on current developments in 
European social and employment policies. The intention is to consider the 
original character of EU legal approaches in these fields and to investigate 
whether, using the notion of fundamental labour rights, there can be a 
beneficial expansion of this notion by means of a broader circulation of 
international sources. ‘Circulation’ is a notion grounded on the necessary 
interrelation – and in some cases the interdependence – of sources 
generated within different legal systems. A ‘pluralistic’ point of view, not 
new in Western European legal traditions, reappears in current legal 
discourse. The main objective of this chapter is to capture developments 
occurring within national and supranational legal orders, and to interpret 
their possible outcomes in terms of new entitlements both for individuals 
and for groups. 
The hypothesis on which this chapter is based is that the evolution 
of labour law at national level has been influenced by EU law, while 
maintaining its own dominant characteristics. This observation suggests 
that national diversities enrich the multi-cultural and multi-level legal 
environment in which law-making takes place. In the first phase of the 
so-called Lisbon strategy, national legislatures have been extremely 
active in furthering  labour law reforms. Legislation adopted over the 
years has intervened significantly in the regulation of individual contracts 
of employment and, more broadly, has had an impact on the reform of 
national labour markets.
1  If one bears in mind the original four pillars of 
the European employment strategy (EES),
2 one soon realizes that there 
has been a convergence of national legislatures towards similar areas of 
intervention. A related argument is that national legislatures had a rather 
predictable canvas on which lines could be drawn and colours could be 
mixed.
3  
Even areas of labour law, such as working time, which was 
regulated by secondary legislation prior to the Lisbon strategy
4, have 
                                                           
1 Reforms have been adopted, for example, in Spain, Italy, Demark, Germany, Poland. 
Information available at www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int.  
2 Employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability, equal opportunities.  
3 For example reforms in Spain and Poland, available at: www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int. See 
also the General Report based on national country studies in 15 Member States: S. Sciarra, 
The Evolution of Labour Law (1992-2003) General Report (2004) at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/generalreport_en.pdf . 
4 Council Directive 93/104 EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working 
time, OJ 1993 L 307/18.  FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON AGENDA 
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become part of a complex multi-level process of policy-making, whereby 
the protection of the right to health and safety at the place of work has 
been confronted by overall objectives such as the ‘modernization’ of 
national legal systems and of the European social model.
5     It can also 
be argued that a common concern, shared by all Member States, to 
decrease unemployment and increase employment would have brought 
them towards similar solutions in their national interpretations of the 
choices to be made and of the priorities to be set.  
However, the fact that, from Lisbon onwards, following the 
Luxembourg process, there was a European strategy and that this was 
pursued actively and with renewed energy by both the Commission and 
the Council changed the nature of national responses and framed them 
within a scheme which slowly acquired its own legal relevance. This point 
needs to be stressed in response to commentators trying to portray a 
negative image of soft law techniques. Such portrayals draw a very 
blurred picture of the duties and obligations of the actors involved in the 
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). In particular they point to the lack 
of sanctions against the failure to respond or the incomplete response of 
national governments. The notion of ‘moral’ sanction, familiar in 
international law when the dispute concerns  variable interpretations of 
legal standards and different ways of enforcing them, does not seem 
strong enough. Neither does it appear convincing to the detractors of the 
OMC to take into account the delicate equilibrium on which national 
governments have to base their choices, bringing together constraints 
imposed by budgetary laws and the growing  social expectations of 
citizens. Such a theoretical dispute on the role of soft law hides, in some 
cases, a deeper - and perhaps unconscious - fear that Europe is at the 
origin of all evils and disruptions in national labour law. Rather than 
falling into the banal category of euro-scepticism, this point of view 
paradoxically may express the aspirations of those who want more from 
Europe, and in a more tangible form.    It is to such questions that labour 
law reforms have to refer, within or without the OMC. 
I shall argue in favour of maintaining and strengthening the soft 
law regime in which the EES first flourished. I shall also submit that in 
such an open process labour law should rediscover a ‘language of rights’. 
In this framework of analysis a comparison with sources external to the 
EU, such as the European Social Charter (ESC), becomes a way of 
expanding the understanding of an evolving notion of labour rights. The 
language of rights, therefore, is not self-referential nor limited to the 
                                                           
5 A national case study is presented by Barnard, ‘The EU Agenda for Regulating Labour 
Markets: Lessons from the UK in the Field of Working Time’, in G. Bermann and K. Pistor 
(eds), Law and Governance in an Enlarged Union (2004) 177.  4 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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European legal system. Labour standards have been influenced by legal 
discourses taking place in a broader international context. Similarly, the 
original discourse evolving within the boundaries of EU law has been 
listened to and absorbed by other international sources.   An historical 
analysis of European social law and of its evolution confirms the feasibility 
of such a scheme and of the broader international sources to which 
reference must continue to be made. The suggestion is to frame Lisbon 
and the current post-Lisbon review in a line of continuity with previous 
steps in the consolidation of a European model of multi-level policy-
making. This trend should find an interface in the most recent attempts 
to develop multi-level Constitution-making, and to do so by incorporating 
sources external to the EU, such as the ECHR.  
In a number of European legal systems, in parallel with the 
vivacious discussion taking place at a supranational level on ways to bind 
the EU to the observance of international standards on fundamental 
rights, the ECHR has been viewed by individual Member States as a 
reliable source to acquire and include in domestic legal systems. This is 
the case with the Human Rights Act of 1998, which entered into force in 
the UK in 2000, and which aims at giving further effect to rights already 
enjoyed under the Convention. Denmark incorporated the ECHR into 
national law in 1997 and Finland did the same in 1990.  In 1995 Finland 
also promoted a constitutional reform which led to the inclusion in the 
Constitution of a new chapter on fundamental rights, followed by a review 
in 2000. Sweden incorporated the ECHR into its national law by means of 
an Act of Parliament in 1994. Notwithstanding the fact that such a source 
is not constitutional, courts may not apply legislation which conflicts with 
the ECHR, since national legislation must comply with its principles.
6    It 
is neither repetitious nor irrelevant to note that national legal systems 
were not equally motivated to pay attention to the ESC. Even though the 
reason may be found in the rich heritage of national constitutional 
traditions in the field of social rights, the discrepancy between these two 
Council of Europe sources continues to be striking. 
 
II. Rights and Policies 
The interesting – and probably not accidental – combination of rights and 
policies in the most recent evolution of labour law at the European level is 
something to be considered before entering into a more detailed analysis 
                                                           
6 More detailed information on such developments in these Nordic countries can be found in 
N. Bruun and J. Malmberg, The Evolution of Labour Law in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
1992-2003, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/ell_da_fi_sv.pdf . FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON AGENDA 
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of the OMC.  Two  framework Directives - the fixed-term work and the 
part-time work
7 Directives – refer in their preambles to clause 7 of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 
providing for an improvement in working conditions by way of an 
‘approximation of these conditions while the improvement is being 
maintained’. They also refer to the Essen European Council, where the 
notion of employment policies linked to a more flexible organization of 
work was first conceived.      The fixed-term work Directive also takes 
into account the 1999 Council Resolution on Employment Guidelines, 
inviting the social partners to negotiate ‘flexible working arrangements’ 
with particular emphasis on the balance between flexibility and security.  
This is to say that both Directives, even before the official birth of the 
OMC at Lisbon, have been framed within employment policies, while 
reproducing the classical formula, compatible with the completion of the 
internal market, according to which approximation of legal standards is 
parallel to improvement.    
Both Directives are built around the principle of non-discrimination 
‘to improve the quality’ of work. The part-time work Directive at Article 5 
specifies that, in order to remove discrimination against part-timers and 
to facilitate recourse to such contracts of employment, Member States 
shall ‘identify and review obstacles’ impeding the expansion of part-time 
work and try to eliminate them.  The fixed-term work Directive at Article 
5 has a slightly different approach and aims to introduce objective limits 
in the recourse to such contracts, so as to justify the renewal or the 
maximum number of renewals of successive contracts. 
These measures are different, and so is the nature of the legal 
command addressed to Member States. Whereas the expression adopted 
in the part-time work Directive is such as to rely on national choices in a 
soft law mood, the fixed-term work Directive indicates clear legal 
requirements which have to be taken into consideration by national 
legislatures in transposing the Directive into domestic law.  
It is important to underline that in both approaches, while 
pursuing the expansion of flexible contracts of employment, the quality of 
such contracts must be maintained and improved. If we correctly 
interpret the language of employment policies, we can translate into clear 
legal obligations the vague exhortation addressed to Member States to 
create ‘better jobs’ and - one could add in the official language of EU law 
- jobs governed by ‘improved’ and ‘approximated’ standards, so as to 
                                                           
7 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
Fixed-term Work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ 1999 L 175/43; Council Directive 
97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on Part-time Work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1998 L 14/9. 6 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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enhance the efficient functioning of an integrated market.    What is new, 
in comparison with the ‘old’ Article 117, now Article 136 TEC? Starting 
from this wide platform of social policies, partially strengthened, after 
Amsterdam, by the reference to the 1961 European Social Charter (ESC), 
harmonization emerged as the most efficient technique.  The historical 
importance of legislation in social policies must be the object of some 
reconsideration in the current debate.    Negative integration, the most 
unsettling and unwanted outcome of a closer Union, is not the result of 
obscure plans put in motion by European institutions, nor the result of an 
aggressive policy put forward by the ECJ. It is a dangerous symptom of a 
lack of social cohesion and of uncontrolled competition among social 
systems, owing to the absence of a minimum platform of rights.
8 
One could argue that significant achievements were reached when 
harmonization was the leading regulatory technique. The consolidation of 
the  acquis in social policies - that on which we base and expand the 
interpretation of fundamental social rights - was brought about by the so-
called ‘structural’ directives of the 1970s, by the extraordinary evolution 
of directives on equal treatment, and, later on, by directives on health 
and safety. Significant examples of secondary legislation expanding 
beyond social policies – such as the European Works Council Directive 
and the Posted Workers Directive – are now, not by chance, the object of 
interesting review by the Commission.
9 Criticism addressed by scholars – 
including the present writer
10 – against the ‘minimalism’ of that 
legislation meet now  a worrying silence on the part of both the 
legislature and the social partners at the European level.
11 
These critical observations about the present, in the light of a 
reconsideration of the historical premises of social policies, lead us 
towards one specific point of the analysis to be developed. The OMC was 
born as an alternative to harmonization. Article 137(2) TEC, as amended 
at Nice, explicitly keeps harmonization out of the Council’s options when 
dealing with social inclusion and modernization of social protection 
systems. When harmonization is kept out of the picture, soft law forces 
interpreters to become familiar with notions such as exchange of 
information on best practices and mutual learning. Even such language – 
                                                           
8 Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe’s Social Self: “The Sickness unto Death”’, in J. Shaw (ed), Social 
Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (2000) 329. 
9 See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2004/apr/ewc_en.html . 
10 Sciarra, ‘Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Social Law’, 1 ELJ (1995) 60. 
11 For example, the Proposal for a Directive on temporary workers encountered significant 
difficulties which led to the submission of an amended proposal for a directive. Compare the 
original document, COM(2002)149 of 20 March 2002, with the amended proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Working Conditions for Temporary 
Workers, COM(2002) 701 final of 28 November 2002.  FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON AGENDA 
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nebulous and a-technical as it is  in the eyes of black-letter lawyers - 
represents a step forward, when compared with expressions previously 
adopted in the TEC, such as ‘encouragement’ and ‘promotion’.
12   
The real novelty in the most current debate on rights and policies 
must be found in a rising awareness of how to avoid the soft law regime 
in which policies on employment and on social inclusion are flourishing 
and affecting the structure of rights on which those policies were built 
and from which they historically originate.  Even this novelty is not an 
historical accident. The strict correlation between rights and policies has 
been sought and pursued by those who believed in reforming the 
Treaties, and in doing so by expanding both the ‘objectives’ of the EU and 
the reference to external international sources.
13  
We should inquire into why interpreters are alarmed – now more 
than in the past – by a possible interruption of this slow, and yet 
significant, interchange between rights and policies. The ‘shift’ from social 
policy to employment policy,
14 which took place in a more visible fashion 
after the launch of the OMC,  can, in fact, be perceived as a threatening 
sign or, even worse, as an obscure and malicious plan of  institutional 
actors.   I shall attempt to answer this inquiry by looking at some specific 
examples arising out of the transposition of the two previously mentioned 
Directives. I shall then analyse how the lack of traditional sanctions in the 
OMC soft law regime has been counterbalanced by monitoring 
mechanisms and how this can be beneficial for the strengthening of 
fundamental social rights.   
 
III. Employment Policies and the ‘Non-regression 
Clause’ in the Directives on Fixed-term Work and Part-
time Work 
                                                           
12 ‘The Community and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such 
as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in 
the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as 
their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so 
as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained…’, 
Article 136 TEC.  
 
13 S e e  D e  W i t t e ’ s  p a p e r  i n  t h i s  v o l u m e  a n d  D e  W i t t e ,  ‘ T h e  P a s t  a n d  F u t u r e  R o l e  o f  t h e  
European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, in P. Alston, with M. Bustelo, 
J. Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (1999) 859-898.  
14 Ashiagbor, ‘EMU and the Shift in the European Labour Law Agenda: From ‘Social Policy’ to 
‘Employment Policy’, 7 ELJ (2001) 311; Regent, ‘The Open Method of Coordination: A New 
Supranational Form of Governance?, 9 ELJ (2003) 190.  8 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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These two Directives have been chosen as examples, in order to 
verify the feasibility of a combination of rights and policies. The result is 
unique: hard law forces Member States to comply, but soft law 
implications are such - particularly in the part-time work Directive – as to 
leave legislatures ample room for manoeuvre.  
The right not to be discriminated against may be linked to specific 
compliance mechanisms; obligations generated by soft policies may 
deviate from legal principles showing a dominant need to comply with 
non-legal targets, such as an increased flexibility in employment 
contracts.  The scenario is such as to create a trade-off between levels of 
protection and promotion of employment. Let us look at some specific 
cases, bearing in mind that in most European countries legislation 
adopted in both fields provoked adaptations of previous legislation. In 
civil law countries this also meant amending clauses and regulations in 
civil or labour codes.  
The excessive increase of fixed-term contracts in Spain,
15 saluted 
as one relevant feature of the new dynamic labour market enhanced by 
the Conservative government’s reforms, had to be counterbalanced by 
disincentives to enter into such contracts. Collective agreements were 
chosen as the right sources in which to specify the objective reasons for 
employing such contracts. In Portugal, too, in the new 2003 Labour Code, 
the attitude is not in favour of fixed-term contracts.
16 In Italy, on the 
contrary, in the transposition of the Directive - one of the first 
manifestations of the centre-right administration in the labour law field – 
the recourse to such contracts has been widened, so as to raise the 
suspicion that the way in which ‘technical, productive organisational and 
substitutive reasons’ has been interpreted may far transcend the purpose 
of the Directive.
17 In this last example the most debatable innovation 
consisted in abandoning the previous legal technique – implying a legal 
definition of cases in which fixed-term contracts were allowed – in favour 
of a wide formula leaving ample space on this issue to the parties to 
                                                           
15 Nearly a third of Spanish employees are on temporary contracts, 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2004/09/feature/es0409104f.html. See the comments by 
F. Valdés Dal-Ré, ‘Recenti riforme del diritto del lavoro in Spagna’, Giornale di diritto del 
lavoro e di relazioni industriali (2005, forthcoming). 
16 On new developments in the Portuguese  Labour Code see: 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/05/inbrief/pt0305101n.html. Additionally, on the 
basis of order No. 255/2002 of 12 March 2002 there are financial incentives for employers 
who convert a fixed-term contract, on expiry, into an open-ended contract. See: 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2002/05/feature/pt0205102f.html  
17 Decree 368 of 6 Sept. 2001, transposing European Directive 99/70 and comments in S. 
Sciarra,  The Evolution of Labour Law (1992-2003) Report on Italy, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/labour_law/docs/ell_italy.pdf . FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON AGENDA 
 
9 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  65/2005 
individual contracts of employment. One of the limits set by the Directive 
at clause 3 of the annexed framework agreement – namely the existence 
of ‘objective conditions’ for entering the fixed-term contract – is therefore 
left to the individual parties entering into a contract of employment.     
This is a reference to a critical interpretation of the non-regression 
clause, in which comparisons among standards of protection are left to 
the courts. The non-binding nature of the European Council’s guidelines 
on employment policies within the equally non-binding EES can, however, 
imply that courts frame their interpretation of legislation within this 
context. While letting hard law prevail over soft law, they may introduce 
a value judgement on the balance between flexibility and security.  In 
Germany, in an attempt to favour workers over the age of 52 at risk of 
losing their jobs, no objective reasons are required for entering fixed-
term contracts. The 2003 reform introducing this amendment could be 
challenged on the ground of age discrimination.
18 This is yet another 
reference to the potential tensions arising from labour market reforms, all 
having to do with varying – at times conflicting - interpretations of 
individual fundamental rights. In the UK the apparent compliance with 
the Directive in indicating a maximum number of years when stipulating 
subsequent contracts may be overcome by Article 8 (5) of the Regulation, 
allowing the removal of this limit in collective or workforce agreements.
19 
A lot would need to be said in this regard on the scope of such 
agreements and on how legislation connected to employment policies 
forces a hierarchy among legal and voluntary sources, allowing the latter 
ample room for manoeuvre, even when their effect is to lower legal 
standards. 
Such complex interpretations of national legislatures’ choices, 
involving multiple sources and multiple levels of enforceability, are 
framed within evolving patterns of employment guidelines and of 
subsequent responses in national policies. The 2004 Employment 
Guidelines, more focused on ‘effective implementation of reforms through 
governance’, recommend in some cases - France is one example – the 
facilitation of the transition from fixed-term to open-ended contracts.
20  
Once more, the political willingness of all actors involved in the process 
strikes a balance in favour of a successful Open Method, based on totally 
unpredictable variables.   
Other examples can be selected, when looking at the transposition 
of the part-time work Directive. The range of solutions adopted is wide. 
                                                           
18 Skidmore, ‘The European Employment Strategy and Labour Law: A German Case-study’, 
29 ELR (2004) 52.  
19 Kilpatrick, ‘Has New Labour Reconfigured Employment Legislation?’, 32 ILJ (2003) 135. 
20 Proposal for 2004 Employment Guidelines, COM(2004) 239 final, of 7 Apr. 2004, at 16. 10 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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We move from the Dutch approach - we all recall the emphasis placed on 
the ‘miracle’ which occurred in that country in the 1990s
21 – where the 
intent is to favour voluntary part-time employment, to the Italian recent 
reform, which moves in a completely opposite direction. In 2003 the 
Italian legislature, amending legislation previously enacted for the 
transposition of the Directive, introduced very flexible clauses - described 
as ‘elastic clauses’ - whereby individual workers, even in the absence of 
collective agreements, may give their consent to the employer’s request. 
O v e r t i m e ,  t o o ,  c a n  b e  a g r e e d  u p o n  a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l .   T h e  I t a l i a n  
example shows very clearly that the interpretation of Article 5 of the 
Directive, namely the removal by the state of obstacles impeding the 
expansion of part-time work, can raise serious doubts about the lower 
standards guaranteed to individual workers.    The notion of what should 
be described as compliance on the part of Member States, when soft law 
policies are intertwined with the enforcement of fundamental rights, 
needs to be investigated further. 
A very controversial provision, present in both Directives under 
discussion, is the so-called non-regression clause, according to which 
implementation of the Directives ‘should not constitute valid ground for 
reducing the general level of protection afforded to workers’. This clause 
may give rise to opposing views. It may appear that EU law interferes 
with the choices of national legislatures, setting a platform of rights which 
is not to be lowered. This would not, however, represent an impediment 
to national parliaments in legislating. They should remain sovereign and 
free to intervene, even amending previous legislation in accordance with 
their own standards of what a ‘valid ground’ is.   
The fundamental right not to be discriminated against, the 
inspiring principle in both Directives, finds itself at the crossroads of 
opposing policies.  It is not as easy as it may appear to argue that 
measures attempting to treat part-time and fixed-term workers in a 
disparate way, lowering pre-existing individual and collective guarantees, 
should be considered illegal. The notion of lower standards itself is at 
stake, when it falls between other measures adopted by national 
legislatures to remove obstacles to the introduction of more flexible 
working conditions.   
I t  r e m a i n s  t o  b e  s e e n  h o w  n a t i o n a l  c o u r t s  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  r e f e r  
cases to the ECJ, specifying how non-compliance of national law with EU 
law occurs by reason of the violation of a fundamental right. The principle 
of equal treatment among comparable workers, a powerful binding 
                                                           
21 J. Visser and A. Hemerijck, A Dutch Miracle. Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism 
in the Netherlands (1997). FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS AFTER THE LISBON AGENDA 
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principle for national judges, must therefore include the evaluation of the 
objective criteria according to which fixed-term workers entered into their 
contracts. Similarly, the violation of the fundamental right not to be 
discriminated against may be grounded in national legislation lacking 
measures ‘ to prevent abuse’ in the excessive use of successive fixed-
term contracts, as is stated in clause 1 of the framework agreement.  
It can be argued that, for those who are entitled to the 
fundamental right in question, the organizational rules observed at the 
place of work represent the precondition for access to the right itself. 
Managerial discretion – as in the case of non-objective reasons leading to 
fixed-term contracts – should be held to be contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment. It is hard - but not impossible - to maintain that such an 
interpretation of a fundamental right could even open the way to a 
preliminary ruling procedure. As for part-time work, the non-regression 
clause is followed by a caveat indicating that Member States and social 
partners, ‘in the light of changing circumstances’, should not see their 
‘right’ to adopt different provisions circumscribed. This truism, which 
confirms Member States’ sovereign legislative powers, finds a limit in the 
principle of non-discrimination between comparable full-time workers. If 
nothing else, this confirms the role of fundamental rights not only as a 
binding guideline for national legislatures, but also as a limit to all 
deregulatory policies which may imperil the full enforceability of the 
principle itself.  The difficult comparison among legal standards and the 
equally difficult evaluation of what less favourable treatment may be 
must be left to national judges, steeped as they are in the historical and 
interpretative context of the overall system of individual and collective 
guarantees in each legal system.  
A first conclusion to be drawn after looking at these selected 
examples is that a-technical notions such as flexibility or modernization, 
widely adopted in the language and in the practice of European soft law, 
do not provide a serious guide for the interpreter, whereas fundamental 
rights and principles do.  At the present stage of European integration 
through law a virtuous combination of soft policies and hard law 
implementation mechanisms seems a valuable solution. It may lead us 
towards a fundamental rights strategy, capable of feeding and 
strengthening the employment strategy. 
 
IV. Monitoring and Sanctioning in the European 
Employment Strategy 
In the absence of traditional sanctions to be imposed on Member 
States involved in the European Employment Strategy, there was a need 12 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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to attract them into an open co-ordination scheme, thus urging them 
towards the achievement of common targets.    The peer review 
mechanism, an important requirement within the process of co-operation 
among Member States enhanced by the EC, cannot be described as a 
traditional sanction. In the evaluation of National Action Plans (NAPs) the 
Council wields its institutional powers in its capacity as ‘soft regulator’.  
The lack of specific indicators in employment policies – unlike those 
applied to social inclusion policies within the OMC
22 p r o v e d  t h a t  t h e  
analysis of legislation in the process of being enacted or simply 
announced by national governments as part of their political agendas, 
had to be based on changing parameters. Similarly, the impetus that the 
Council wanted to give to change existing laws was not inspired by 
strictly legal criteria and has been abandoned.     Since ‘open’ meant that 
the method had to respect states’ prerogatives and competence, the co-
ordination could be no more than a mere indication of possible common 
directions to follow, and not of how to follow them. Consequently, unlike 
in the co-ordination of macro-economic policies, no real warnings or 
sanctions could be issued against Member States    The request put 
forward at the Nice Council was to arrange a mid-term review of the 
Luxembourg process, which began at Lisbon, and to investigate even 
further into the actual impact of the OMC on national performances. The 
Nice Social Agenda 
23  pursued ‘quality in work’ as an important 
objective, and so did the Employment Committee, working on quality 
indicators.
24 
All this activism inside European institutions and other relevant 
bodies prepared the ground for a series of country studies. They 
disclosed, in some cases, that interesting changes were taking place 
inside national administrations in order to comply with the OMC.
25 
Member States took seriously their duty to comply with soft policies, at 
least in building up their own internal infrastructures and in promoting 
adaptations of domestic deliberative procedures.   In this exercise one 
can find traces of significant self-criticism by the Commission, which has 
developed in several Communications into possible ways to improve the 
                                                           
22 Social Protection Committee, Report on Indicators in the Field of Poverty and Social 
Exclusion, October 2001, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-
prot/soc-incl/indicator_en.htm . Comments in M. Ferrera, M. Matsaganis, S. Sacchi, ‘Open 
Coordination against Poverty: The New EU “Social Inclusion Process”’, Journal of European 
Social Policy 12 (2002) 227. 
23 Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, 
Annex I, European Social Agenda, para. 26.  
24 Report by the Employment Committee, Indicators of Quality in Work, 23 Nov. 2001.  
25 I m p a c t  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  E m p l o y m e n t  S t r a t e g y ,  
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means and – mostly importantly - to reach the objective of a ‘high level 
of employment’.
26  A  p r a c t i c e  o f  m o n i t o r i ng, applied to employment 
policies, is yet another way of governing complex processes of change by 
learning and by adapting to such complexity. The Commission does not 
make light of the difficulties of guaranteeing a transition between 
different forms of work, nor can it deny that the two worlds of standard 
and non-standard contracts may end up mirroring two separate labour 
markets.
27  
Labour law remains central to all adjustment and change, and so 
does anti-discrimination law. However, through the analysis of soft law 
documents produced in the realm of the OMC, labour lawyers  perceive a 
distinct shift in the adoption of regulatory techniques. Rather than 
pursuing outcomes – as in directives – the aim is to promote ‘processes 
and methods’.
28  This change of perspective is not without worries, even 
when it is contextualized and made functional to specific – possibly 
temporary – needs of the supranational legal order and to its re-
organization of  political priorities.   To quote another example, a close 
examination of the employment strategy related to EU anti-racism policy 
and to the implementation of the Race Directive gives rise to criticism, in 
as much as it shows that there are points of divergence, despite the 
apparently common objective of combating discrimination by way of 
including the excluded in the labour market.
29 
I want to describe as ‘co-ordinated reformism’ the combination of 
soft promotion of national responses and hard implementation of 
fundamental rights. In this interchange of regulations, external and 
objective expertise is required in order to strengthen a criticism which 
cannot otherwise be translated into sanctions.
30   A recent product of this 
c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  i s  t h e  r e p o r t  p r oduced by the Employment Taskforce 
                                                           
26 Communication from the Commission, Strengthening the Implementation of the European 
Employment Strategy, COM(2004)239 final, 7 Apr. 2004. 
27 Communication from the Commission, The Future of the European Employment Strategy. 
A Strategy for Full Employment and Better Jobs for All, COM(2003) 6 final, 14 Jan. 2003, at 
14. 
28 Ashiagbor, ‘The European Employment Strategy and the Regulation of Part-time Work’, in 
S. Sciarra, P. Davies, and M. Freedland (eds), Employment Policies and the Regulation of 
Part-time Work in the European Union (2004) 37. See also Regent, supra n. 14. 
29 Bell, ‘Combating Racial Discrimination Through the European Employment Strategy’, 6 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2004) 55. 
30 I have analysed the role of expertise in the elaboration of social inclusion policies and 
found that it has a significant impact on setting the agenda of the Commission. See Sciarra, 
‘The ‘Making’ of EU Labour Law and the ‘Future’ of Labour Lawyers’, in C. Barnard, S. 
Deakin, and G. Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law. Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple QC 
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chaired by Wim Kok.
31  The already mentioned 2004 Employment 
guidelines were inspired by this Report and referred to it when 
revitalizing the European strategy and calling on Member States to make 
a renewed common effort. This is a confirmation of the fact that the OMC 
uses monitoring in place of sanctioning. Within the employment strategy 
the adjective ‘open’ seems to dominate the noun ‘method’ and 
consequently transform the final outcome into a looser co-ordination. The 
acknowledgement of diversities - among national legal systems as well as 
among regulatory techniques inside each national system – may seem to 
contradict the obligation to co-ordinate. Such an obligation, referred to by 
both the Commission and the Council, appears now – almost 
paradoxically – to be  expanded and in a sense complicated by the 
appearance of the OMC in other fields, in particular in the co-ordination of 
social inclusion policies. The links between the latter and employment 
policies make them complementary to each other  in several cases. 
In this unsettled scenario the ‘constitutionalization’ of the OMC in 
part I of the Treaty establishing a Constitution
32 may make it a victim of 
its own success. The OMC will be symbolically visible as a constitutional 
provision, and yet remain a method, as such unenforceable and non-
binding. Its acquired relevance in the Treaty will, perhaps, impose on EU 
institutions - the Commission and the Council, but not the ECJ –the 
obligation to search for more precise and normative monitoring 
mechanisms. It is therefore of some importance to suggest that this 
innovation in Part I should be closely linked with the new opening Articles 
in Part III. Bringing about mainstreaming as an alternative technique to 
traditional sanctions, the opening Articles of Part III may indicate a new 
path to national courts. The ‘aim’ to eliminate inequalities and to promote 
equality between women and men, as in Article III-116, is common to all 
activities referred to in Part III. Mainstreaming also applies to 
employment, social protection, and social inclusion policies, as well as to 
education, training, and the protection of health (Article III-117). A broad 
anti-discrimination clause is provided in Article III-118, while the three 
following Articles deal with environmental and consumer protection and 
with animal welfare.   The inclusion of mainstreaming Articles in the 
Treaty, like the constitutionalization  of  the OMC, appears to be a 
confirmation of existing practices. The EU Race Directive 
33 and the 
                                                           
31 European Commission, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by 
W. Kok, November 2003, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/pdf/etf_en.pdf .  
32 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310/1, Article I-15.  
33 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal 
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related anti-racism policy are linked and connected with other measures 
and actions by reason of a mainstreaming principle.
34 Gender 
mainstreaming has also been adopted in European social policies
35  
If we connect the OMC with a close observation of mechanisms of 
integration through hard law, we can see new perspectives ahead, 
despite the apparent institutional weakness of social and employment 
policies. Enforcement could become a widespread technique and the 
object of monitoring through independent bodies.      It is for this reason 
that another process, parallel to that described so far, becomes relevant 
for the present analysis.  
 
V. …And in the Enforcement of Social Rights 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights approved at Nice opened a 
wide-ranging and unprecedented discussion among lawyers and created a 
beneficial interchange among different disciplinary approaches.  Social 
rights included in the Charter are another sign of a slow and yet 
continuous progression, allowing social and employment policies to 
emerge and gain autonomy from other policies.  We need to investigate 
how monitoring the enforcement of social rights and sanctioning Member 
States when they do not respect them can contribute to strengthening 
soft law regimes under the OMC.  
A group of independent experts, chaired by O. De Schutter, is 
currently experimenting with a widespread monitoring of fundamental 
r i g h t s  i n  E U  M e m b e r  S t a t e s .
36  Both the methodological and the 
theoretical implications of this sophisticated exercise are very relevant in 
the field of social and labour law, particularly when it comes to 
establishing criteria of comparability among labour standards in the 
enforcement of employment policies.  While adopting fundamental rights 
as parameters in the implementation of the OMC, the independent 
experts are looking for ways of strengthening the weak basis of soft law 
                                                           
34 Bell, supra n. 29. See also J. Shaw, Mainstreaming Equality in European Union Law and 
Policymaking (2004), in particular at 22ff. 
35 Mückenberger, ‘Gender Mainstreaming’, in U. Mückenberger, Manifesto Social Europe 
(2001) 269. See also Bell, ‘Equality and the European Union Constitution’, ILJ 2004, at 252, 
indicating that: ‘Aside form anti-discrimination legislation, the mainstreaming concept is a 
parallel attempt to secure equality through means other than litigation’.  
36 E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) Report on the 
Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002 
(2003) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/rights/network/rapport_2002_en.pdf 
and E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) Report on the 
Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union in 2003 (January 2004), at 
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machinery. ‘Guiding policies in a more systematic manner in such a way 
that they are drawn up to take into account the objective of 
implementing fundamental rights’
37 is what the experts aim at. In the 
future this whole process could beneficially be monitored by an 
independent agency.
38 This rich collection of data could bring about a 
circular, self-reproducing, perfect harmony between rights and policies. 
     The point to be emphasized is that ‘mutual evaluation’ and ‘collective 
learning’ should be based on objective criteria and on comparable 
standards of implementation. This would subtract evaluation – so far the 
only available sanction - from the climate of political negotiation which 
seems to characterize the OMC. One cannot ignore that soft law 
procedures in the co-ordination of employment policies are thought of as 
functional to the Council’s broad economic guidelines, thus permitting 
mutual learning among national governments in a limited and restricted 
area whose borders are defined by EU macro-economic priorities.    The 
starting  assumption is that the OMC – as previously stated – is a 
regulatory technique alternative to harmonization. This does not imply 
that the market has already reached an ultimate level of integration. It 
can be argued, in fact, that a final and conclusive period of market 
integration is almost incompatible with the unique nature of the EU, 
characterized by the fact that integration at all levels is a permanently 
open process. Positive integration appears to be the only elective way of 
avoiding distortions of competition in a changing legal environment, when 
fundamental rights are at stake.  
I suggest that the OMC, by insinuating flexible measures into the 
regulation of employment contracts, may create a potentially less stable 
environment for the guarantee of fundamental rights. I therefore submit 
that the OMC should be driven by policies which gradually implement a 
minimum level of rights, in order to establish minimum guarantees for 
individuals. Fundamental rights of the last generation, such as the right 
                                                           
37 Section 5 in the Introduction to the Report for 2002, ibid., at 25.  
38 See now the Communication from the Commission, The Fundamental Rights Agency. 
Public Consultation Document, COM(2004) 693 final, 25 October 2004. See also the recent 
proposal put forward by President Barroso for 'locking in' a culture of fundamental rights in 
EU legislation. The idea is to screen systematically all Commission legislative proposals for 
compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and favour 'impact assessment' of the 
impact of legislation on individual rights. See European Commission Presse release, Brussels 
27  April 2005 at www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do. Compare also the critical 
analysis of  A. Andronico e A. Lo Faro,  Defining Problems: Open Method of coordination, 
Fundamental Rights and Governance, in O.De Schutter and  S. Deakin, Social Rights and 
Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of 
Social Europe?, Brussels, Bruylant 2004(?) or 2005??  Their auspice is that fundamental 
rights be expanded as procedural rights within OMC, rather than leaving to such a 'method' 
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to training, follow individuals throughout their working lives and have 
become increasingly relevant in allowing transition from one occupation 
to another one. They should, therefore, be constructed and implemented 
as rights detached from employment contracts and attached to working 
and career paths of a flexible nature. The right to the protection of 
personal data – to take another relevant example - can be enforced 
differently in different phases of the working life and should follow the 
individual, rather than the contract of employment. The right to the 
reconciliation of family and working life can also have a different impact 
in different cycles of the individual’s professional development and 
become an essential link to the fulfilment of other fundamental human 
rights.  Even the right of access to employment services should be 
thought of as a fundamental right responding to the different needs of 
individuals in different phases of their working lives.  
Within the framework of the  OMC we can re-think a traditional 
distinction between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights of a 
procedural nature, the latter being dependant for their full enforcement 
on the state’s active intervention. Drawing on this distinction it is possible 
to see how fundamental freedoms – positive and negative freedoms of 
association – rather than being constructed, as happens under most 
European national constitutions, as preconditions for the exercise of other 
rights, are in reality  inaccessible to marginal workers and to the socially 
excluded.  In the new, vast universe of precarious and flexible workers an 
historical paradox can be presented as a theoretical framework in which 
to develop a practice of fundamental rights. Procedural rights, such as 
the right to training, the right to re-conciliation of work and family life,  
and the right of access to employment services, may gradually become 
instrumental to the progressive emancipation of precarious and 
economically dependant workers. When such fundamental rights are fully 
granted by active state intervention, even access to fundamental 
freedoms may become enforceable in practice. What we are witnessing at 
the moment in most countries is the inability of traditional social partners 
to represent in traditional ways the most marginal and precarious groups 
within the labour force and the newly emerged economic actors, such as 
employment and temporary work agencies.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks: The Relevance of the 
European Social Charter 
One of the most positive remarks made by commentators on the 
Nice Charter has to do with the fact that all fundamental rights are 
assembled in a single document, thus overcoming the segregation of 18 SILVANA SCIARRA  
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social rights in a different source document, as in the Council of Europe’s 
European Social Charter. The latter has, however, been an interesting 
point of comparison and inspiration, both for the monitoring exercised by 
independent experts and for the Collective Complaints Protocol, which 
was added in 1995 and entered into force in 1998.
39 The original system 
of monitoring and sanctioning enforced under the ESC has always been 
praised by European labour lawyers, including among them leading 
figures who served on the Committee as independent experts.
40 In the 
academic discussion preceding the 1996 IGC, an independent evaluation 
of the enforcement of social rights – as opposed to rights justiciable in 
courts  -   was advocated  by a group of labour lawyers.
41 That reference 
was intended to pave the way for innovative solutions within the 
European debate on fundamental rights, with an emphasis on so- called 
collective social rights, some of which were – and still are – explicitly left 
out of EU  competence.
42 That debate also yielded arguments in favour of 
a clearer visibility of the ESC among the external sources referred to in 
European Treaties. The latter suggestion was partially followed up in 
subsequent reforms of the Treaties and even in the drafting of the 
Constitution,
43 but the impact of this source remains inadequate.  
The current discussion, in view of the ratification of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution, seems to go into different directions, when 
accession to the ECHR – not to the ESC – is envisaged. Social rights are 
still at the crossroads of differing interpretations especially because of the 
unclear distinction between principles and rights inserted into the final 
clauses of the Charter, now inserted in Part. II of the Constitution. 
Meanwhile, several links can be established in EU law between social 
rights and employment policies. A number of possible future expansive 
interpretations are possible to imagine. Article 125 TEC describes the 
employment strategy, specifying that it is ‘particularly for promoting a 
skilled, trained and adaptable workforce’. Legal measures adopted to 
enhance flexibility, thus improving employment figures, should not lead 
                                                           
39 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints, European Treaty Series - No. 158. 
40 Kahn-Freund, ‘The European Social Charter’, in F. G. Jacobs (ed), European Law and the 
Individual (1976) 10ff. 
41 R. Blanpain, B. Hepple, S. Sciarra, and M.Weiss, Fundamental Social Rights: Proposals for 
the European Union (1996). 
42 The right to organize and the right to strike and lock out are excluded from EU 
competence (Art. 137(5) TEC). Criticism of the notion of ‘collective’ social rights is voiced by 
T. Novitz, ‘Are Social Are Social Rights Necessarily Collective Rights? – A Critical Analysis of 
the Collective Complaints Protocol to the European Social Charter’, EHRLR (2002) 50. 
43 References are in Sciarra, ‘La constitutionnalisation de l’Europe sociale, entre droits 
sociaux fondamentaux et soft law’, in O. De Schutter and P. Nihoul (eds), Une constitution 
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to degrading working conditions or to diminished guarantees. One could 
argue that the fundamental right to dignity, much emphasized in the 
structure of the Nice Charter, is infringed when no fair balance can be 
established between management prerogatives and workers’ compliance 
with them. Jobs ‘on call’ or extreme forms of part-time work may be 
taken as examples. In such employment contracts there is often 
disproportionate discretion left to the employer, both in the working time 
arrangements and more generally in establishing working conditions. In 
all such cases there may be an instrumental reference to the supremacy 
of EU law and EU targets. Choices of national legislatures that do not 
respect fundamental social rights may not be justified as a necessary 
compliance with the Council’s guidelines issued under the OMC. 
Furthermore, recourse to descriptive and non-legal terms such as 
‘modernization’ does not justify the adoption of legal measures which 
infringe fundamental rights. Specific social indicators must correspond to 
such broad definitions of political programmes, so that the evaluation of 
national responses to the OMC remains based in a well grounded 
measurement of social change. The issue of comparability must, once 
more, be recalled as a necessary starting point in all attempts to learn 
from one another. It can be argued that monitoring and reporting, 
especially when such actions are carried out by truly independent bodies, 
can be a way to alert national actors – be they individuals or groups – to 
pursue litigation before national courts. These are cases in which 
fundamental social rights can be interpreted by national courts as 
minimum levels of guarantees not to be waived nor reduced. 
Fundamental social rights can also be sources of inspiration for national 
legislatures, even though no duty to legislate can be envisaged. In fields 
in which secondary law is already enforceable, further improvements of 
existing standards could become a strategy for mutual learning. A good 
example is the reconciliation of family and working life, a field in which 
numerous links with employment policies can be discerned. 
Circulation of international standards, an idea proposed in the 
opening of this chapter, is one way to enhance further developments in 
the language of rights. However, one cannot deny that the collective 
complaints procedure, the most challenging novelty in the apparatus of 
ESC sanctions, in the field of labour rights, has not yet fulfilled its full 
potential, due also to a lack of activity on the part of the European social 
partners. 
44 The list of organizations listed in Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol may also need re-thinking, if one had to take into account   
groups of  non-standard workers and other categories of economically 
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dependent workers, or other groups at risk of being discriminated against 
on all grounds provided for by EU law. I have tried to indicate how raising 
awareness of the respect for fundamental social rights may also result in 
interventions of national courts, by way of preliminary ruling procedures.  
Moreover, the originality of regulatory techniques in the EU, as 
indicated in the description of OMC and its current enforcement, requires 
that unique forms of monitoring be put in place. Recourse to independent 
expertise should not be left in the discretion of governments alone. 
Independence should result from a combination of well established 
expertise in the field and distance from governments and the social 
partners. In the EU tradition independent agencies have the role of 
making specialized contributions in specific fields, relieving European 
institutions of the urgent need to sanction or to evaluate Member States’ 
performances. The proposal to establish a Fundamental Rights Agency 
follows in this direction. In expanding the remit for the creation of a 
Centre on racism and xenophobia, it is suggested that the Agency be 
organized on thematic lines. This trend could be confirmed by the 
announced creation of a European Gender Institute. 
45 It is also worth 
noting that one of the main tasks of the Agency should be the ‘collection 
and analysis of objective, reliable and comparable data at European 
level’.
46  
One of the points that has been strongly advocated in this chapter 
is the objectivity of data on which all evaluations and possible complaints 
should be based. There may be a need to bring the culture of 
fundamental labour rights more closely to the attention of institutions 
active in pursuing further protection of human rights. A separation among 
areas of fundamental rights and the means of enforcing them may seem 
counter-intuitive if we look at their universality, which is aimed at in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the yet-to-be-ratified Constitution. 
However, international sources proceed in the direction of specifying 
areas and means of protection, sometimes exposing new spheres of 
human rights to the challenges of international law.
47 It may be worth 
exploring the specificity of social rights at the present stage of evolution 
in national and supranational law, and to do so while leaving behind the 
inferiority complex that, over the years, has characterized such a large 
                                                           
45 COM(2004) 693 final, supra n. 38, at 4 and 5. See also the conclusions of the European 
Council of Brussels (17-18 June 2004) for the creation of a European institute specializing in 
equality between men and women, para. 45.  
46 COM(2004) 693 final, supra n. 38, at 8.  
47 An example, relevant to the present discussion, is the Council of Europe’s Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal data, ETS - No. 
108.  
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area of scholarship and policy-making. To avoid the separation of labour 
rights, we must learn to treat them as citizens’ rights.  